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Problematic practice in integrated impact  
assessment: the role of consultants and  
predictive computer models in burying  
uncertainty 
Ronlyn Duncan 
It is well known in impact assessment that predictive model outputs will be as credible as their inputs 
and that model assumptions will drive outputs. What is less well known is how the practice of 
integrated impact assessment with its pervasive use of predictive computer models and multiple teams 
of consultants can influence evidence relied upon in deliberations over the impacts and benefits of 
major projects. This paper draws on an integrated impact assessment of a major energy infrastructure 
project in Australia known as Basslink to examine the epistemic implications of current practice. It will 
be argued that what has become standard procedure can serve to diminish the disclosure of prediction 
uncertainty. 
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ROJECT-BASED INTEGRATED impact as-
sessment requires proponents to document 
existing social, economic and environmental 
conditions and present predictions about expected 
post-development changes together with possible 
outcomes of mitigation (Glasson et al, 2005;  
Thomas, 1998). To this end, it has become standard 
practice for proponents to engage multiple teams of 
consultants and scientists across a range of special-
ised fields to develop what eventually becomes a 
unified impact assessment statement. 
It has also become standard practice for these ac-
tors to use often complex computer models to derive 
the requisite quantified predictions about future con-
ditions (Wachs, 1990: 148; Glasson et al, 2005: 
130). For instance, a raft of computerised predictive 
economic and environmental models were used in 
the assessment of Basslink, an undersea electricity 
cable that now links the island state of Tasmania to 
the Australian mainland. 
The Basslink draft Integrated Impact Assessment 
Statement (IIAS), over 6,000 pages in length,  
involved no less than 30 consultant firms (NSR En-
vironmental Consultants Pty Ltd, 2001: 1.12–1.14, 
2.6–2.7). Notably, predictions about future environ-
mental impacts and scenarios for mitigation were 
derived from the modelling of the economic aspects 
of the project. This approach, which directly linked 
predicted environmental conclusions to the project’s 
economic forecasts, appeared to give the propo-
nent’s case for Basslink considerable coherence (see 
JAP, 2002a; 2002b). It has also meant that the scru-
tinised environmental conclusions were anchored to 
an economic future that, as yet, has not eventuated. 
Hence, the Basslink case study highlights the 
challenge of integrating not only the assessment of 
the social, economic and environmental aspects of a 
major project (Duncan and Hay, 2007), but also the 
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evidence on which decisions are based. The analysis 
presented in this paper seeks to answer the question: 
what are the implications of what has become  
standard impact assessment practice for process 
transparency and proponent accountability? 
Predictive computer models 
Before moving on, I would like to clarify what is 
meant by ‘predictive computer modelling’. A model 
is defined by Hartmann (1996: 4 citing Guetzkow et 
al, 1972) as “a set of assumptions about some sys-
tem”. The assumptions can be derived from ‘general 
theory’ or they can be ‘idealized’ representations 
(Hartmann, 1996: 4). Models can depict a system at 
rest (static) or changing over time (dynamic). 
Once a system has been defined, its dynamics are 
described by simulations. Hartmann (1996: 5) ex-
plains that a “simulation results when the equations 
of the underlying dynamic model are solved”. Ac-
cording to Hartmann (1996 citing Niehans, 1990), 
models have their origin in the late nineteenth cen-
tury when theoretical physicists used mathematics to 
build models to describe and understand nature. 
These models helped scientists investigate natural 
phenomena and derive what are now well-known 
mathematical relationships. 
The ‘model-method’ was extended to economics 
in the decades that followed (Hartmann, 1996: 3). 
Statistical and repetitive simulations using random 
numbers to approximate a real system were carried 
out from the late 1940s and applied to atoms, war-
fare and industrial productivity (Smith, 1999). These 
days, models and simulations are “used in nearly 
every engineering, scientific and technological dis-
cipline” (Smith, 1999: 4), and for a good reason — 
they allow a system to be constructed, investigated, 
reconfigured and tested with relative ease. 
Smith (1999: 3) notes that system models have 
“proved to be more cost effective, less dangerous, 
faster, or otherwise more practical than experiment-
ing with the real system”. Simulations allow an ana-
lyst to experiment with a model to test a system’s 
behaviour under varying conditions and with alter-
native interventions. It is these attributes that  
make models and simulations so compelling in  
integrated impact assessment, for both proponents 
and decision-makers. 
Notwithstanding their considerable utility, it is im-
portant to acknowledge the limitations of predictive 
models and simulations, as these are particularly rele-
vant in the context of impact assessment where the 
stakes are high and there is usually no turning back 
after a decision has been made. For instance, despite 
constantly increasing computing power, we remain 
unable to accurately represent in a model the com-
plexity of real economic and environmental systems 
and, in particular, their interactions (Smith, 1999). 
In addition, values permeate models and simula-
tions, as decisions always have to be made about 
what to put in, what to simplify and what to leave 
out. Furthermore, data inputs are often limited, un-
available, difficult and expensive to obtain or in 
need of recalibration (Smith, 1999; see also Irwin 
and Wynne, 1996). 
In this paper I use the term ‘predictive computer 
modelling’ with the intention of encapsulating the 
act of both building a system model and conducting 
simulations with it. I do so also to emphasise the fact 
that models used in impact assessment are usually 
computer-based and the contingent nature of their 
predictive outputs. 
The pitfalls of practice 
In integrated impact assessment, although predictive 
computer modelling allows proponents to present 
with considerable clarity environmental impact and 
mitigation scenarios as well as the economic and 
social aspects of major projects (De Jongh, 1988; 
Glasson et al, 2005; Thomas, 1998), their use poses 
a number of challenges. For instance, in addition to 
the issues discussed above, our habitual misinterpre-
tation and misuse of numbers impedes transparency 
and accountability (Thomas, 1998: 154–160). 
Porter (1995) maintains that numbers are com-
monly thought to derive from the application of  
impersonal mathematical rules and thereby eliminate 
the exercise of judgement. Porter (1992a: 640) de-
scribes quantification as a “technology of distance”, 
as it has served to encourage confidence when one 
cannot be present to check all the details or be sure 
how answers have been arrived at. As such, quanti-
fication provides a means for (often misplaced) trust 
to be extended over long distances (Porter, 1995; 
1992b). 
In the politically charged arena of integrated im-
pact assessment, our use (and misuse) of numbers 
becomes crucial. Indeed, a number of authors report-
ing on environmental impact assessment and the 
integrated assessment of major projects have found 
that prediction claims often appear much more  
robust than is warranted (e.g. Beder, 1993; De 
Jongh, 1988; Glasson et al, 2005: 135; Spry, 1976; 
Thomas, 1998: 26). 
Moreover, Flyvbjerg et al (2002; 2003) and 
Wachs (1990) argue that in the assessment of infra-
structure projects numbers are readily manipulated 
and misrepresented by proponents, consultants and 
governments to present projects in a favourable light 
or simply to get projects over the approval line from 
where there is no turning back. 
Tennøy et al (2006: 52) provide a useful review 
of the dimensions of prediction uncertainty in envi-
ronmental impact assessment and demonstrate quan-
titatively that the disclosure of uncertainty diminishes 
as knowledge claims move through the impact  
assessment process. Specifically, in respect of major 
infrastructure projects in Norway, Tennøy et al (2006: 
50) investigated (a) the disclosure of uncertainty, and 
(b) the extent to which assumptions and data limita-
tions were divulged in assessment documents. 
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In terms of (a) they identified four levels of the 
expression of uncertainty in three categories of pro-
cess documents, and calculated that although uncer-
tainty was acknowledged in most initial prediction 
documents (i.e. technical reports), such was not the 
case in around two-thirds of the impact assessment 
statements and final determinations. 
In terms of (b), assumptions and data limitations 
were discussed in more than two-thirds of the pre-
diction documents, but in only a quarter of the im-
pact statements and even less in the final 
determinations. Tennøy et al (2006: 52) conclude 
that “decision-makers are not made aware of the 
prediction uncertainty” and “EIA predictions thus 
appear more certain than they are”. 
A divergent inference to be drawn from the for-
mer conclusion of Tennøy et al (2006) is that propo-
nents, proponents’ consultants and decision-makers 
have a vested interest in making public documents 
and their decision commentary appear defensible 
and politically palatable. Consequently, these actors 
often endeavour to minimise the public disclosure of 
uncertainty; see, for example, Flyvbjerg et al (2002; 
2003), Hilgartner (2000), Jasanoff (1987; 1990), 
Shackley and Wynne (1996), and Wachs (1990). 
On this basis, while it would be the case that pre-
dictions appear more certain than is warranted as 
concluded by Tennøy et al (2006), the extent to 
which decision-makers are not made aware of uncer-
tainty is a moot point which is explored in this paper. 
Research scope 
The work of Tennøy et al (2006) provides a depar-
ture point for this paper. Here, I focus on what has 
become standard integrated impact assessment prac-
tice — namely, the pervasive use of predictive mod-
els by multiple teams of consultants across a range 
of specialised fields. My analysis draws on ideas that 
probe the process of knowledge production. It seeks 
to contribute to explaining how the disclosure of 
uncertainty can diminish as the assessment process 
proceeds. 
Furthermore, in accepting that actors’ endeavours 
to minimise the public disclosure of uncertainty is an 
important part of the knowledge production story 
(see Jasanoff, 1987; 1990; Hilgartner, 2000; Shackley 
and Wynne, 1996), I examine how it would be the 
case that decision-makers are not made sufficiently 
aware of prediction uncertainty, as concluded by 
Tennøy et al (2006). 
A second point of departure is the issue of propo-
nent assumptions. Tennøy et al (2006) recommend 
that these assumptions should be better communi-
cated and their specifics deliberated upon in a much 
more meaningful and accountable manner. The im-
portant point is made by Tennøy et al (2006: 52) that 
it is “difficult for others to realise that quite different 
results could have been reached if other input data 
and assumptions had been chosen”. In other words, 
from alternative starting points, a project could look 
vastly different. 
Relatedly, De Jongh (1988: 66) distinguishes ‘un-
certainty of prediction’ from ‘uncertainty of values’. 
Whereas the former would be dealt with by empirical 
research, the latter would require a personal approach 
with “scoping, communication, participation, nego-
tiation and mediation” (De Jongh, 1988: 80). De 
Jongh’s recommendations point to the intangible and 
contingent nature of values issues and the need for 
their deliberation prior to empirical investigations. 
The Basslink case study illustrates the defining 
role that a proponent’s formative value frameworks 
can play in directing choices on which numbers to 
select and which numbers to ignore for input to and 
output from predictive models (Irwin and Wynne, 
1996). 
The significance of this paper is that it demon-
strates the existence of knowledge production blind-
spots and examines their epistemic implications for 
the practice of integrated impact assessment. I argue 
that it is imperative for impact assessment practice 
to be centred on procedures that openly confront 
uncertainty and work with rather than against it (see 
Geneletti et al, 2003; Gibson et al, 2005; Glasson, 
1994; Strand, 1999; Tennøy, 2008; Wynne, 1992a 
for more discussion on addressing uncertainty in 
general and in impact assessment specifically). 
Analytic framework 
My analysis uses as a case study the Basslink inte-
grated impact assessment process conducted in the 
state of Tasmania during 2000 and 2002, and also 
events that have precipitated since the project’s 
commissioning in 2006. It draws on my review, 
comparison and evaluation of documents tabled with 
Tasmania’s Resource Planning and Development 
Commission (RPDC), an independent statutory body 
established to oversee the assessment of projects of 
state significance. The documents examined in-
cluded: 
• the Basslink draft IIAS (NSR Environmental 
Consultants Pty Ltd, 2001); 
• the assessment panel’s IIAS critique report 
(Brown and Root Services Asia Pacific Pty Ltd, 
2001); 
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• the proponent’s economic reports (Connarty, 
2001a; 2001b; HEC, 2001a; 2001b); 
• initial and update environmental reports (Davidson 
and Gibbons, 2001a; 2001b; Davies, 2001; Davies 
and Cook, 2001; Koehnken et al, 2001; Koehnken, 
2001; Howland, 2001; Kriwoken, 2001a; 2001b); 
• the proponent’s overview and summary reports 
(Locher, 2001a; 2001b); 
• the joint proponent’s consultant reports (IES, 
2000a; 2000b; URS New Zealand Ltd, 2001; 
CREA, 2000); 
• the assessment body’s draft and final reports 
(JAP, 2002a; 2002b); 
• the final IIAS (NSR Environmental Consultants 
Pty Ltd, 2002); and 
• evidence tendered at the public hearings in October 
and November 2001, which I attended. 
I was given permission by the RPDC to transcribe 
recorded evidence that was not publicly available. 
More recent events have been reported in the Tas-
manian media and documented in the proponent’s 
annual reports. 
I draw theoretical insight from constructivist theo-
ries of knowledge in the field of Science and Tech-
nology Studies (STS). In general, constructivist-STS 
critically analyses the methods, claims and institu-
tional contexts of science, as well as the modes and 
consequences of the translation and deployment of 
scientific knowledge claims within and beyond the 
domain of science (Irwin, 2001). 
In particular, my analysis looks at the Basslink  
assessment process from an epistemological per-
spective. An epistemology describes a particular 
conception of how knowledge is produced and the 
factors which contribute to its extent and validation 
— in other words, how it is that we know (Gubrium 
and Holstein, 2000; Irwin, 2001). 
Currently, western science tops the knowledge  
hierarchy of intellectual authority (Bohme, 1997). In 
terms of epistemology, this status rests on the premise 
that science can and does produce ‘rational’ and ‘ob-
jective’ knowledge (Irwin, 2001). In the arena of im-
pact assessment these authoritative categories are 
used freely in defence of a proponent’s conclusions. 
As already alluded to, however, researchers in  
the fields of impact assessment and STS have shown 
that such claims are often difficult to defend when 
underlying assumptions are unearthed and challenged 
(for example, see Flyvbjerg 2002; 2003; Wachs, 1990 
in impact assessment and Jasanoff, 1987; 1990;  
Hilgartner, 2000; Wynne, 1992b in STS). 
The foundational theoretical premise for this 
analysis comes from Collins (1987; 1988) who argues 
that the interpretation of science in public draws its 
credibility from the distance created between the per-
formance of science and its audience. He makes the 
following observation (Collins, 1988: 726): 
Close proximity to experimental work, particu-
larly where there is an element of controversy, 
makes visible the skilful, inexplicable and there-
fore potentially fallible aspects of experimenta-
tion, it lends salience to the web of assumptions 
that underlie what counts as an experimental 
outcome … Time spent on, or near, the seat of 
controversy leads to the conclusion that the only 
reason that certainty is ever attained in science is 
because this privileged viewpoint is the preserve 
of so few. Thus, that there is more certainty 
when distance from the cutting edge of science is 
maximized is not just initially surprising: it ap-
pears that distance from the cutting edge of sci-
ence is the source of what certainty we have. 
In essence, Collins argues that with greater distance 
from the location of knowledge production, the less 
uncertainty one will be exposed to and the less un-
certainty one will see (or see the need to be con-
cerned about). 
Collins’s insight is applied in the work of 
MacKenzie (1990: 419; see also Duncan, 2003;  
Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 1987) which inves-
tigates the sociological and institutional dimensions of 
technology, in particular the development of weapons 
guidance systems in the United States. MacKenzie 
(1990: 372) maintains that there is a variable relation-
ship between actors’ perceptions of uncertainty and 
their distance from the research front, forming what 
he has termed the ‘certainty trough’ (Figure 1).1 
Figure 1: The certainty trough 
Source:  MacKenzie (1990: 372) © MIT Press
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To provide an initial overview, Figure 1 depicts 
‘social distance’ from where knowledge is produced 
from left (closest) to right (most distant) along the  
x-axis, and uncertainty from low to high along the  
y-axis (MacKenzie, 1990; 2007: 1). On the left, ac-
tors are closely involved in the production of knowl-
edge — for example, developing and applying 
methodologies; designing, constructing and conduct-
ing experiments; or carrying out observation, data 
collection and statistical analyses. Uncertainty here 
is in the medium to high range. 
On the right, at greatest distance from the knowl-
edge production source, uncertainty is at a very high 
level. The middle section is conceived as the ‘cer-
tainty trough’: it is here that uncertainty is at its low-
est and, correspondingly, certainty is at its highest 
(MacKenzie, 1990: 372). Notably, in this zone, un-
certainty decreases with distance. MacKenzie (1990: 
419) suggests that the certainty trough describes a 
‘distribution of certainty’ on the basis that actors’ 
proximity to the location of knowledge production 
will influence the attribution of the credibility of 
knowledge claims with which they are presented. 
The relationship identified by MacKenzie (1990) 
indicates that those closest to where knowledge is 
constructed (i.e. those doing the experiments or 
working with the primary data) will attribute an un-
expectedly high level of uncertainty to aspects of 
their work (MacKenzie, 2007). For instance, al-
though not usually publicly expounded, scientists 
will be cognisant of the uncertainties in their ex-
periments, data, methods and findings. 
As MacKenzie (1990: 419) puts it, for these ‘in-
siders’ there is “doubt of a more private and more 
limited, but nevertheless real, kind” (MacKenzie, 
1990: 371); importantly, these actors are conceived 
as knowledge ‘producers’ (MacKenzie, 1990: 372). 
He suggests that, in a controversy, the uncertainties 
held by these knowledge producers, if identified, can 
be used by those in opposition to undermine claims 
supporting a technological development. 
On the right of Figure 1 are those at greatest dis-
tance from where knowledge is produced. These  
actors are not the focus of this paper but it is important 
to note that they will perceive the highest level of un-
certainty. Committed to an alternative technology, 
strategy or project, these ‘outsiders’ will be alienated 
from the existing proposal and, in all likelihood, the 
institutions recommending it (MacKenzie, 1990; 
2007: 1). In the context of impact assessment, interest 
groups opposed to a particular project or alternative 
proponents would be located here. 
Taking a closer look at the certainty trough lo-
cated between those closely involved in knowledge 
production and those ‘alienated’ from it, the actors 
here are constituted as ‘program loyalists’ as this in-
between group “believes what the brochures tell 
them” (MacKenzie, 1990: 371). In the context of 
impact assessment, they might be proponents that 
commissioned studies or governments in support of 
a project being assessed. 
They might also be decision-makers, members of 
the public or interest groups not necessarily opposed 
to the project. Such actors are knowledge ‘users’, 
not its producers nor its antagonists (MacKenzie, 
1990: 372). Importantly, MacKenzie (1990: 419) 
argues that the durability of technical ‘facts’ is 
‘hardest’ in the location of the certainty trough; 
without resources or reasons to unearth the contin-
gencies, they are likely to fade from view. 
To reiterate the distinction between knowledge 
‘users’ and knowledge ‘producers’ (MacKenzie, 
1990: 372), the former have to rely on others to suf-
ficiently communicate the uncertainties to them, 
whereas the latter would be aware of the contingen-
cies in their predictions and capable of reporting on 
them if called upon to do so. 
What the ‘certainty trough’ shows us is that a dis-
connection occurs as knowledge claims move from 
the hands (or computers) of knowledge ‘producers’ 
to knowledge ‘users’ (MacKenzie, 1990: 372). In 
other words, by virtue of their distance from the lo-
cation of knowledge production and the lack of an 
intimate connection with the experiments, testing or 
primary data, knowledge ‘users’ will attribute a rela-
tively low level of uncertainty to the knowledge 
claims with which they are presented (MacKenzie, 
1990: 372). 
Shackley and Wynne (1995) found this to be the 
case in their study of the science/policy nexus in 
respect of climate change general circulation mod-
els. They conclude (Shackley and Wynne, 1995: 
114, emphasis added): 
The perceived certainty of knowledge claims of 
a research speciality is greatest some way from 
the actual site of knowledge production … So, 
practitioners may attribute greater certainty to 
knowledge from another speciality than the 
practitioners in the first specialty would attrib-
ute to it themselves. 
These insights are useful for examining the practice 
of integrated impact assessment where it is usual for 
an array of consultants and scientists from different 
fields to be pulled together by a proponent to pro-
duce, with the aid of a string of predictive computer 
models, an integrated impact statement. Such was 
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the case with Basslink where predictive economic 
modelling outputs via several intervening iterations 
were translated into environmental model inputs 
and, subsequently, into predictions about environ-
mental impacts on Tasmania’s Gordon River, to 
which I will now turn. 
The Basslink project 
Basslink, Tasmania’s 360-kilometre Bass Strait 
power cable, was approved by state and national 
governments in 2002 and commenced operation  
in May 2006. Basslink was built and is owned  
and operated by a private energy transmission com-
pany. Tasmania’s hydro-generator, a corporatised 
government business enterprise (the proponent), 
pays the owner a facility fee to access the cable and 
has arrangements to settle arbitrage transactions 
across the link. 
It was intended that the cable would allow the 
proponent to export its hydro-electricity for a pre-
mium price into Australia’s National Electricity 
Market (NEM) at intervals of peak demand. By im-
porting electricity into Tasmania from mainland 
sources at relatively low prices during intervals of 
low mainland demand, Tasmania could save its  
water resources to derive a premium price for its 
hydro-electricity when sold back into the NEM. 
The assessment process that approved Basslink  
examined many issues. Among them, and the focus of 
this paper, was the extent to which Tasmania’s par-
ticipation in the NEM would change the operation  
of the Gordon Power Station, Tasmania’s largest hy-
dro-generation facility, which had been providing 
relatively stable base-load electricity for Tasmania. 
It was expected that Basslink would change the 
power station’s operations by the delivery of highly 
variable peak load into the NEM. These changes 
were expected to alter the volume and variability of 
water discharges from the Gordon Power Station 
down the Gordon River which runs through and 
forms part of the Tasmanian Wilderness World Heri-
tage Area (TWWHA) (Connarty, 2001a; Locher, 
2001a: 19). However, a lack of surplus water in Tas-
mania has meant that, so far, the cable has been used 
predominantly to import electricity from the main-
land, rather than to export it (Locher, 2001a:25). 
Consultants, computer models and  
disaggregated data 
Figure 2 is an overview of evidence in support of the 
proponent’s conclusions on environmental impacts 
for the Gordon River resulting from changes to elec-
tricity generation operations at the Gordon Power 
Station. 
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Notably, all of the Gordon River evidence was 
anchored to one predictive economic model known 
as PROPHET (Figure 2, top left), which was devel-
oped and used by Consultant 1 to study electricity 
markets. To provide further detail on the PROPHET 
model, the consultant required a number of data in-
puts to run its market simulations, such as load fore-
casts, network and regional loss factors, historical 
load traces, generator capacities, generator mainte-
nance schedules, short-run marginal costs, demand 
management behaviour, generation forced outage 
rates and new generation plant assumptions (IES, 
2000b: 10). 
The model user can insert and alter these inputs 
(IES, 2002). Historical information was available for 
most of these aspects, although Consultant 1’s ‘es-
timates’ were relied on for the last four in the list 
(IES, 2000b: 10; see also Duncan, 2004). The 
PROPHET model was marketed as (IES, 2002: 1): 
The essential tool for Electricity Market par-
ticipants. In a competitive market, it helps  
if you know the future. However, there will  
always be uncertainty in outcomes; who can 
predict the weather or plant breakdowns; but 
this does not mean you need to be totally  
unprepared. IES’s PROPHET model enables 
you to heighten your awareness of possible  
developments. 
It appears that although Consultant 1 did not envis-
age its model would eliminate uncertainty, it did 
advocate that it was possible and prudent to be well-
informed. To manage the uncertainty of weather, 
plant breakdowns and load variation, the model in-
corporates Monte-Carlo methods (IES, 2002: 1), 
which use random numbers and immense numbers 
of replications to derive statistical outputs from  
past experience of these events (see Smith, 1999;  
Hartmann, 1996). 
Returning to Figure 2, PROPHET was used, inter 
alia, to predict changes in wholesale electricity 
prices (IES, 2000a; HEC, 2001b). Specifically, 
Basslink was expected to reduce such prices as it 
was injecting extra capacity into an undersupplied 
peak electricity market (Connarty, 2001a: 12; IES, 
2000a). Using PROPHET, Consultant 1 calculated 
that the wholesale price of electricity would reduce 
in Tasmania by 6.7% by 2004 and 1.4% by 2010 
(IES, 2000a: 1). It is important to note that these 
percentages represent changes from prices that were 
predicted to exist in the future without Basslink. For 
example, in 2004, without Basslink the wholesale 
energy price was forecasted to be $30 per megawatt 
hour; with Basslink it was estimated to be $28, and 
this difference represents a 6.7% reduction in the 
wholesale price (IES, 2000a: 8). 
To calculate expected profit increases for Tasma-
nia’s state-owned electricity businesses with 
Basslink, Consultant 1 summed the reductions in 
wholesale electricity prices, its calculations of 
changes in retail margins and PROPHET’s predic-
tions of revenues arising from trading surplus energy 
across Basslink (IES, 2000a). The profit figures of 
$15.2 million in 2004 and $29.2 million in 2010 
(IES, 2001a: 13) were then used by Consultant 2 as 
revenue inputs to its general equilibrium model to 
identify the number of jobs the project could be ex-
pected to deliver and the increase in economic 
growth at state and national levels (CREA, 2000). 
PROPHET outputs were also used by Consult-
ant 1 to derive ‘functional relationships’ about how 
the dispatch of different fuel types would change in 
the NEM with Basslink (IES, 2000b; URS New Zea-
land Ltd, 2001: 2–9). Such data were then passed to 
Consultant 3 to calculate overall market changes in 
greenhouse gas emissions that would be expected to 
arise from extra capacity in the NEM provided by 
access to Tasmania’s non-carbon hydro-energy 
(URS New Zealand Ltd, 2001). 
PROPHET’s price projections were also passed  
to the proponent. Its in-house consultants incorpo-
rated the PROPHET outputs into its hydro-system 
optimisation model, which culminated in the  
Tasmanian Electricity Market Simulation Model 
(TEMSIM); see middle far left of Figure 2.  
TEMSIM modelled Tasmania’s hydro-system and 
simulated how it could be expected to operate under 
Basslink conditions. 
Coupled with water storage levels, the PROPHET 
price data was the driver of imports and exports in 
TEMSIM and, as such, triggered simulated dis-
charges from the Gordon Power Station (Connarty, 
2001a; Hydro Consulting, 2000: 25). The propo-
nent’s sensitivity analyses undertaken on Tasmanian 
load were controversial as the initial load variations 
chosen by the proponent were unrealistically low. 
These tests appeared to create more uncertainty than 
they resolved (HEC, 2001b: 2–6). 
TEMSIM was utilised by the proponent for three 
tasks. First, it calculated revenues potentially attain-
able by the proponent from exports generated by the 
expected operation of Basslink in the NEM (HEC, 
2001a: 4). Its outputs were then used to develop and 
continually update the proponent’s business case for 
Basslink (House of Assembly, 2003). 
Second, TEMSIM was used at the outset of the 
proponent’s environmental investigations to identify 
areas of the hydro-system that could be most af-
fected by the operation of Basslink, and which 
would require studies for the impact assessment 
process (Hydro Consulting, 2000). Third, TEMSIM 
was used to predict the magnitude of environmental 
impacts from changes in hydro-generation along the 
middle section of the Gordon River to which World 
Heritage Area protection legislation applied (Locher, 
2001a; 2001b). 
To estimate the environmental impacts, the 
PROPHET price data was transformed in TEMSIM 
by the proponent’s in-house consultants into  
hydrologic data (Hydro Consulting, 2000: 25); this 
simulated the variability and magnitude of power 
Problematic practice in integrated impact assessment 
 
 Impact Assessment and Project Appraisal March 2008 60 
station discharges under Basslink conditions, and the 
information was translated into a ‘with Basslink’ 
baseline (Connarty, 2001a; Locher 2001a). 
The baseline was then passed to environmental 
researchers engaged by the proponent (Consultants 
4, 5, 6 and 7 in Figure 2) for use in their various en-
vironmental predictive models in the specialised 
fields of fluvial geomorphology, riparian vegetation, 
macro-invertebrates and fish (Clayton Utz, 2001). In 
these model iterations, the baseline data was trans-
formed into yet another set of variables. 
For instance, in the case of riparian vegetation, 
power station discharges were converted into hours 
of inundation to predict how long plants could sur-
vive waterlogging with the operation of Basslink 
(Davidson and Gibbons, 2001a). In terms of macro-
invertebrates, power station discharges were used to 
calibrate risk bands for habitat change to gauge how 
Basslink could affect the river’s macrofauna (Davies 
and Cook, 2001). Using their respective calculations, 
the environmental researchers also made recommen-
dations on mitigation options (Davidson and  
Gibbons, 2001a; Davies and Cook, 2001; Koehnken 
et al, 2001; Howland, 2001). 
In a final iteration, the environmental researchers’ 
reports were integrated by the proponent’s in-house 
consultants into a summary report (Locher, 2001a) 
and an overview report (Locher, 2001b). Duncan 
(2006) and Duncan and Hay (2007) argue that this 
process of integration served to contextualise the 
researchers’ environmental conclusions with the 
proponent’s operational, economic and political im-
peratives which, consequently, lessened the cogency 
of their findings. 
Both sets of documents were reviewed by Con-
sultant 8, the proponent’s World Heritage Area 
(WHA) expert (Kriwoken, 2001a; 2001b). The criti-
cal issue for the proponent was whether the overall 
predicted Basslink impacts were likely to be deter-
mined by the assessment body to contravene WHA 
protection legislation (Duncan, 2006). Consultant 8 
determined that Basslink would not compromise the 
TWWHA values (Kriwoken, 2001a; 2001b). 
In summary, the proponent’s business case for 
Basslink and its assessments of the location and 
magnitude of environmental impacts, state-owned 
electricity business profits, wholesale electricity 
price changes, state and national macro-economic 
projections for jobs and economic growth, changes 
in overall greenhouse gas emissions and WHA im-
pacts were all anchored solely to the findings of one 
predictive economic model, PROPHET, which was 
described by the assessment panel’s own consultants 
as “not detailed or explained” (Brown and Root Ser-
vices Asia Pacific Pty Ltd, 2001: 9-40). 
Using the certainty trough to identify the 
knowledge disconnections 
To examine the implications for process transpar-
ency and proponent accountability of what has  
become standard integrated impact assessment prac-
tice, the ‘certainty trough’ proposed by MacKenzie 
(1990: 372) is a useful heuristic. I use it to trace the 
mobility of knowledge claims, their durability and 
their disconnection from their source of production 
in the context of impact assessment. I also use it to 
shed light on how assumptions, uncertainty and val-
ues (De Jongh, 1988) can become buried within 
what are proclaimed by proponents as ‘scientific’ 
and therefore ‘independent’ conclusions about the 
impacts and benefits of major projects. 
Using the certainty trough, Figure 3 shows how 
the attribution of uncertainty varied between Con-
sultant 1 as the knowledge producer of PROPHET’s 
outputs (medium- to high-range uncertainty) and the 
subsequent users of its outputs (low-level uncer-
tainty) (MacKenzie, 1990: 372). 
Figure 3 also overlays multiple certainty troughs 
to depict the cascade of interconnections between 
the teams of consultants and subsequent actors set 
out in Figure 2.2 Here we can see how the various 
sets of consultants that were each required to under-
take a particular piece of work and reliant upon the 
model outputs of another were constituted simulta-
neously as knowledge ‘producers’ and knowledge 
‘users’ (MacKenzie, 1990: 372). 
As a result, at each translation step the contingen-
cies arising from the assumptions and values  
embedded in PROPHET and TEMSIM were pro-
gressively cordoned off from each subsequent team. 
In effect, the recipient of another team’s model out-
puts was, willingly or not, constituted at increasing 
distance away from the location of knowledge  
production and, thereby, within the certainty trough 
(MacKenzie, 1990: 372). 
In addition, Figure 3 combines the troughs to il-
lustrate the compounding nature of the foundational 
reliance on the PROPHET outputs. When the 
troughs are combined and visualised as ‘in phase’, 
the implications are acute — both the peaks and 
troughs are amplified, as depicted (although some-
what exaggeratedly) by the dashed line in Figure 3.3 
In these circumstances, the certainty trough becomes 
a potentially irrevocable breach for actors consti-
tuted as knowledge users (MacKenzie, 1990: 372). 
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In the case of Basslink, all actors were knowledge 
users, with the exception of Consultant 1 upon 
whose model outputs all the others were contingent. 
The following example from the Basslink process 
illustrates how distance from the location of knowl-
edge production can serve to disconnect knowledge 
claims from their contingencies and, effectively, 
make them appear more reliable than is warranted. 
The consultants commissioned by the assessment 
body to critique the Basslink draft IIAS raised the 
crucial connection between TEMSIM (and by impli-
cation, PROPHET) and all of the Gordon River en-
vironmental studies. They stated (Brown and Root 
Services Asia Pacific Pty Ltd, 2001: 12-27): 
TEMSIM is used as the basis of impact predic-
tion and assessment for all the … [proponent’s] 
investigations. If the model is not accurate  
for operational scenarios then the predicted  
impacts will be wrong. 
Nevertheless, the assessment body concluded that 
TEMSIM was a “reasonable predictive model” and 
that the proponent’s use of the model was “a reason-
able approach to adopt” (JAP, 2002b: 327). Incongru-
ously, the assessment body also justified its 
favourable view of the model on the basis that “sub-
mitters suggested no other models or significant 
changes to TEMSIM” (JAP, 2002b: 327). 
With their interrogation of the IIAS knowledge 
production process and their resultant view of it 
from very close range, the assessment body’s  
consultants were concerned and explicit about the 
contingency of the proponent’s environmental  
conclusions arising from TEMSIM and PROPHET. 
In contrast, at greater distance, the assessment body 
was satisfied that the proponent had done all it could 
to identify the environmental impacts. 
Formative value frameworks 
Having used the ‘certainty trough’ (MacKenzie, 
1990: 372) to examine how the mechanics of impact 
assessment practice can influence the attribution of 
uncertainty in the process of knowledge production 
and obscure much from view, I now return to the 
issue of values raised by De Jongh (1988). I do so to 
discuss the implications of not unearthing these for-
mative frameworks that are inevitably imposed by 
proponents by virtue of their role in the development 
of the impact statement. 
Consultant 1 used past market behaviour to func-
tionally operationalise its PROPHET model in terms 
of its price dispatch sequence (Duncan, 2004: Chapter 
5). Accordingly, Consultant 1 reified in PROPHET 
and its outputs a particular view of the NEM and 
how actors would behave in it in the future, based 
predominantly on what had occurred in the past 
(IES, 2000a). 
Similarly, in TEMSIM, informed by how it had 
operated in the past and how it hoped and expected 
to do so in the future (that is, as it had in the past in 
terms of its market share), the proponent embedded 
Figure 3: Overlaid certainty troughs (solid curves) and combined certainty troughs (dashed curve) 
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in its model unrealistic judgments about load, de-
mand and how the Tasmanian electricity market 
might unfold (HEC 2001a; 2001b; Duncan, 2004). It 
also used past precipitation and storage levels in 
Tasmania to calculate what water should have been 
available for export, and this, in turn, informed its 
revenue forecasts. 
Importantly, such predictions could have but did 
not take account of climate change or declining stor-
age inflows that were apparently well-understood 
within the proponent’s organisation and the Tasma-
nian government (Connarty, 2001b; Duncan, 2004: 
Chapter 2; HEC, 2001b; House of Assembly, 2003: 
25). This was curious given that the proponent has 
been an ardent advocate for early action on climate 
change. 
The overriding formative value framework that 
underpinned both the PROPHET and TEMSIM 
models was that the past would be repeated in the 
future (Evans, 1997). The following testimony from 
the public hearings shows how easy it was for the 
developers of PROPHET to pass on their contingent 
view of the world to the proponent. When ques-
tioned at public hearings about how price changes 
would affect the operating environment for the pro-
ponent over the 25-year agreement period, the pro-
ponent’s representative replied (Connarty, 2001c): 
it’s been based on the prices input from … 
[Consultant 1] data, so as far as that goes we’re 
relying on them to model the market as accu-
rately as possible and so they provided us with 
the price input data. 
When questioned further about the price data, the 
proponent’s representative said (Connarty, 2001c): 
I’d have to get … [Consultant 1] to actually 
discuss that. We weren’t privy to the assump-
tions put into it. We were just supplied with 
that data and assumed it was representative of 
future Victorian prices. Again, we had no input. 
… the assignment was to … [Consultant 1] to 
supply suitable data for us to model the 
Basslink situation. 
Of course, it could be argued, as the assessment 
body did, that the approach of Consultant 1 and the  
proponent was reasonable (see JAP, 2002b). How-
ever, the proponent openly divulged that it was 
unlikely that the past would be repeated in the fu-
ture. The proponent was entering for the first time a 
market environment whereby “strategies will be em-
ployed to maximise energy trading values, and pat-
terns of bidding will also reflect these broader 
financial objectives” (Locher, 2001a: 17). It was also 
revealed that “one aspect of the TEMSIM model 
which may vary depending on the future drivers for 
…[the proponent], is the allocation of water value 
and energy” (Connarty, 2001a: 22). As long as these 
drivers stayed the same, TEMSIM would remain 
relevant in the future. 
Notwithstanding these qualifications, the assess-
ment body relied on the proponent’s justifications 
about the reliability of the modelling it had pre-
sented (JAP, 2002b: 322–327). By the time the envi-
ronmental conclusions were presented to the 
project’s government decision-makers, the premise 
that the past would be repeated in the future which 
circumscribed the original and subsequent model 
inputs and outputs had already been disconnected 
from its contingencies and effectively deemed  
non-negotiable. 
Yet, it is difficult to see what other options were left 
open to the assessment body, given its political im-
perative to finalise the assessment process and deliver 
a decision, as well as its constraints with respect to 
time and money. While the assessment body re-
quested the proponent to revisit the load sensitivity 
analyses with different assumptions, and sought fur-
ther answers on many queries and issues raised dur-
ing the public hearings (see JAP, 2002b), the 
problem was that, by this stage of the process, the 
models had been constructed and the simulations 
run: the economic and environmental case had al-
ready been stitched up — it could not be undone. 
To date, reality has displayed the folly of the pro-
ponent’s worldview. In such a view, the continuation 
of a national government subsidy for renewable en-
ergy projects would have made available revenue for 
the proponent to build its planned wind farms to 
augment domestic supply and thereby free up hydro-
electricity export capacity (HEC, 2001a: 5); precipi-
tation levels and exports across the cable would have 
been at levels sufficient to derive revenue to cover 
the cable’s original and revised facility fee, to make 
a profit and return funds to the government; also, the 
project cost and annual facility fee would have  
remained within initial estimates. 
In stark contrast to the future embedded in the 
models and subsequent data sets constructed in 2000 
and 2001, the federal government did not extend the 
renewable energy subsidy,4 the annual facility fee 
virtually doubled to around $92 million per year  
owing to unexpected project and finance costs  
(Bevilacqua, 2003; Hydro Tasmania, 2003; NSR 
Environmental Consultants Pty Ltd, 2002: 12) and, 
because of consistently low storage inflows not  
adequately accounted for in the modelling, there 
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have been few opportunities to export into the NEM. 
Instead, the proponent has had to import electricity 
across Basslink at prices much higher than  
originally anticipated. It has also had to buy natural 
gas for its back-up generation to assist in satisfying 
domestic demand (Hydro Tasmania, 2007). Omi-
nously, as well as calling on the state government 
for a $300 million cash injection (The Mercury, 1 
June 2006), the proponent has declared that it will 
not be in a position to pay a dividend to the govern-
ment in 2008. 
In 2004, 2005 and 2006 it paid $40 million and in 
2007 just over $20 million (Hydro Tasmania, 2005; 
2007), but the proponent has stated that after 2008, 
“in the absence of an equity injection, dividends 
have been limited to $10 million per annum, subject 
to profitability” (Hydro Tasmania, 2007: 32). More-
over, in July 2007, the Office of the Tasmanian En-
ergy Regulator (2007) determined that residential 
electricity prices would increase by 15.7% in 2008 
and a further 4% in July 2008 and July 2009.5 
In yet another twist, which could work in the hy-
dro-generator’s favour, the project’s final approval 
contained a requirement for the proponent to under-
take only six years of post-Basslink monitoring and 
adaptive management. Given the depleted storages 
and the likelihood that it will be some time before 
they can be replenished (assuming they will be), it is 
probable that any export-induced environmental im-
pacts will occur outside the prescribed monitoring 
and adaptive management period. For instance, 
without mitigation, the identified environmental im-
pacts on the Gordon River included an increased 
probability of river bank scour (Koehnken et al, 
2001), a loss of riparian vegetation 1.5 metres beyond 
an existing dead-zone along the riverbanks (Davidson 
and Gibbons, 2001a: 11) and the loss of macro-
invertebrate assemblages (Davies and Cook, 2001).6 
Conclusions:  
the implications of buried uncertainty 
Current practice appears necessary and justifiable to 
meet the often conflicting objectives of public  
disclosure and epistemic rigour, especially in inte-
grated assessments where there are inherent linkages  
between economic production, social outcomes and 
environmental impacts. The analysis in this paper 
suggests, however, that what is currently accepted as 
standard procedure could be obstructing the very 
objectives the process is intended to deliver. 
From a constructivist-STS perspective, the cumu-
lative epistemic outcome of integrated impact  
assessment practice — which could also be seen as 
its triumph — is the appearance of the diminution of 
uncertainty; see also Duncan (2003). As the credibil-
ity of a proponent’s claims appears to strengthen, the 
contingencies would be multiplying with each  
modelling iteration. 
The Basslink case study demonstrates how current 
integrated impact assessment practice can create 
considerable distance between knowledge ‘produc-
ers’ and knowledge ‘users’, and eventually sever 
their connections. To the extent that these roles  
become interchangeable, collaborating actors are 
constituted in the ‘certainty trough’ (MacKenzie, 
1990: 372), thus compromising the evidence relied 
upon in deliberations concerning whether or not a 
major project should proceed and on what conditions. 
Hence, unless explicit clarifications are called for, 
what has become standard procedure would serve to 
isolate actors contributing to the development of an 
integrated impact statement. This isolation would 
diminish disclosure between collaborating consult-
ants as well as to the impact statement audience, be 
they supporters, critics, regulators, assessors or deci-
sion-makers. Therefore, the reliability of the conclu-
sions presented in impact statements would not be 
attributable to the rigorous challenge or peer-review 
of a proponent’s claims, but rather to ‘imposed trust’ 
between actors required to collaborate at the behest 
of a proponent. 
Although he suggests it should not be taken too 
literally, MacKenzie (1990: 393) uses the metaphor 
of a Russian doll to describe a technology on the 
basis that it is really not just one ‘black box’ but 
many, one inside the other. This progressive ‘black-
boxing’ imagery is useful here for envisioning how a 
proponent’s values are perpetuated in the movement 
of knowledge claims — although configured differ-
ently, each modelling exercise shares a striking  
resemblance. 
Also highlighted is the fact that the ‘independence’ 
which proponents inevitably claim for the consultants 
they engage can only be partial. It has been shown that 
conclusions represented as ‘scientific’ and thereby 
‘independent’ can not only rest on but perpetuate a 
proponent’s partisan worldview about how its project 
is expected or hoped to operate in the future. Hence, 
the Russian doll metaphor draws attention to a pro-
ponent’s influence over a project’s regulatory out-
comes by virtue of providing its consultants with 
their foundational and contingent baseline data. 
Tennøy et al (2006: 55) maintain that “if EIA is to 
be a good decision-aiding tool, it must be because it 
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gives decision-makers a better understanding of the 
consequences of their decisions”. The analysis pre-
sented here contends that what has become standard 
practice — the pervasive use of predictive models 
by multiple teams of consultants — currently serves 
to diminish the disclosure of uncertainty. The epis-
temic ramifications are that over-confidence has be-
come instilled in the assessment process. 
Problematically, current practice does not explic-
itly recognise this shortfall, and so procedures that 
might address it are deemed non-obligatory or sim-
ply unnecessary. For example, with over-confidence 
comes an assessment body’s decision not to require 
a proponent to consider and explicitly disclose 
worst-case economic, social and environmental  
scenarios. As a consequence, proponents are not re-
quired to set out their contingency plans for such 
eventualities. 
Further still, decision-makers do not mandate 
post-auditing of projects to test the veracity of the 
framings and futures embedded within a proponent’s 
conclusions. For example, post-auditing is an essen-
tial tool for learning from experience (Flyvbjerg et 
al, 2002; 2003; Glasson et al, 2005), and would have 
constructive consequences for process transparency 
and proponent accountability by instigating substan-
tial reform at the front-end of the process (Dipper et 
al, 1998; Wood et al, 2000). 
It is difficult to see how the objectives of process 
transparency and proponent accountability in impact 
assessment can be met if proponents’ formative 
value frameworks are not systematically identified 
and opportunities carved out for them to be chal-
lenged, negotiated and, where necessary, changed. 
Nor can these objectives be met if it is not recog-
nised that uncertainty blind-spots are an inherent 
characteristic of what appears to have become indis-
pensable integrated impact assessment practice. 
By locating these vulnerabilities and examining 
their broader epistemic ramifications, it is hoped that 
this analysis can contribute to the reform of current 
practice and demonstrate the necessity of precau-
tionary and mitigative strategies that “plan to learn, 
design for surprise and manage for adaptation”  
(Gibson et al, 2005: 111). 
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Notes 
1 For commentary on and a critique of MacKenzie’s ‘certainty 
trough’ (1990: 372), see Lahsen (2005), who modifies the  
distribution’s configuration in the context of climate change  
science and the use of general circulation models. 
2 The idea of combining certainty troughs comes from Shackley 
and Wynne (1995: 122) in their discussion of ‘overlapping cer-
tainty troughs’.  A distinction is being made here as overlap-
ping would put the troughs out-of-phase, whereas when 
overlaid the compounding outcome of integrated impact  
assessment practice on uncertainty disclosure is captured. 
3 This compounding effect also has implications for those at 
greatest distance from the location of knowledge production 
but not in support of a project.  Figure 3 shows that these ac-
tors will perceive potentially inordinate levels of uncertainty. 
This phenomenon was reflected in several Basslink public 
submissions of critics who made very lengthy comments on 
the draft IIAS in excruciatingly minute detail. 
4 However, it should be noted that a change in the national gov-
ernment in late 2007 has seen a commitment to now extend 
the renewable energy subsidy. 
5 The regulator stated that around half the increase was due to 
Tasmania’s energy retailer, Aurora Energy, having to pay 
higher prices to purchase electricity from the hydro-generator 
proponent. 
6 Although the proponent would argue that these impacts will be 
mitigated, Duncan (2006) discusses the limitations of the pro-
ponent’s predictive modelling and its claims about the mod-
elled effect of mitigation on full capacity discharges.  In 
addition, Duncan and Hay (2007) document the conditions the 
proponent placed on its mitigation commitments and argue 
that these are likely to serve to erode rather than enhance the 
environmental quality of the Gordon River. 
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